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ABSTRACT: Defending the tenseless theory of time requires 
deal ing adequately with the experienee of temporal beeoming.  
The issue eenters on whether the defender of tenseless t ime 
ean provide an adequate analysis of the presenee of experience 
and the appropria teness of eertain of our atti tudes toward fu­
ture and past events. By responding to a reeent article, ' Pas­
sage and the Presenee of Experience ' ,  by H.  Seott Hestevold, 
1 shall at tempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time 
is possible. 
I n l  he status of temporal becoming, temporal passage, or the transitory 
aspect of time is a paradigmatic metaphysical problem. It involves a prima 
facie conflict between reason and experience. The experience in  question 
involves the passage of time; the "perception" of events flowing from the 
future into the present and from the present into the past . This experience is 
reflected in statements such as '1 can 't wait until the basketball  sea son 
comes around again ' ,  'Hurray, 1 am finally graduating ' ,  and 'Thank good­
ness the ex am is over ! ' When we rational ly  reflect upon these statements 
and wonder what real ity must be l ike in order for them to be true we find 
logical difficulties, such as McTaggart 's paradox, emerge. Faced with this 
conflict the goal of the metaphysician is to provide an ontology of time that 
fits the experience in question and is logically consistent. Broadly speaking, 
two theories of time have taken up the challenge to real i ze that goal : the 
tensed and the tenseless theories. According to the tenseless view, the logi­
cal problems surrounding temporal becoming are real and can only be 
avoided by recognizing,  in Donald C .  Wi l l i ams '  words, ' the myth of 
passage'  [ 1 5 ] .  According to the tensed view, the experience of passage and 
the presence of experience are real and can only be accounted for by accept­
ing the tenses as reflecting basic ontological distinctions . 1  
The debate between proponents of the two camps has been fought on 
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several different fronts . Unti l the early 1 980's the question o f  translatabi l ity 
was of central importance. If tensed disGourse could be defined without loss 
of meaning into tenseless discourse then it was argued the tenses lacked 
ontological significance . More recently, defenders of the so-called "new 
tenseless theory of time" have sought to demonstrate that the necessity of 
tensed discourse is compatible  with time being tenseless . 2  In order to do this 
successfully i t  is necessary for the detenser to deal adequately with the 
experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the de­
fender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of 
experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future 
a n d  pas t  events . In a recent  art i c l e ,  ' Passage  a n d  the Presence of 
Experience ' ,  H.  Scott Hestevold argues that the tenseless theory of t ime 
cannot account for our experience of time [3] . In what fol lows, I sha l l  
attempt t o  show his objections t o  the tenseless theory can b e  overcome,  and 
an adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible.  
The Presence of Experience 
According to the tenseless theory of time there are no basic ontological 
differences between past, present and future events. All events exist tense­
lessly in the network of earlier, later and simultaneity, temporal relations. 
If, however, a l l  events exist tenselessly, then how can the detenser explain 
our knowledge that a certain experience, say a headache, is [presently] 
oceurring? How can the detenser explain the faet that experiences can be 
known to be present? According to Hestevold, no explanation is possible 
beeause 
The cJaim that experienees, essential ly, ean be known to be present 
implies that there eannot oceur an experience which occurs only tense­
lessly;  experiences cannot be mere tenseless occurrences on the B 
series ! ( [3] : 543) 
The reasoning underlying the implication in the above passage is open to 
two interpretations. First, since none of the terms of the B-series (the series 
of events generated by the earl ier-later relation) are intrinsically present, no 
experienced events on the B-series can be known to be present . Second, if 
the detenser defines the presence of an experience in terms of its occurring 
at a certain date, or its being simultaneous with some temporal i tem, then it 
follows all experiences are (tenselessly) present. In that case , however, the 
detenser cannot explain the knowledge we possess of whieh experiences are 
happening now. For if a l l  our experiences exist tenselessly at the moment 
they do, what is the explanation for the phenomenological fact that certain  
of  those experiences are  known to  be oecurring now whi le  others are not 
known to be occurring now, or are even known not to be oecurring now? 
1 think the detenser has a reasonably good response to that question. It 
begins with the truism that whenever we are aware of an object (or have an 
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experience) we are conscious of being aware of that object (or of having that 
experience) . Thus, one aspect of our knowledge of the present is grounded 
in the consciousness of our experiences at the time they are occurring . If we 
combine that thesis with the claim by Thomas Reid that ' consciousness . . .  
i s  a n  immediate knowledge of the present ' ( [ 1 0] :  359) we arrive a t  the 
required resuIt :  For an individual ,  every experience he or she is conscious 
of is one known to be present . Of course, Hestevold may ask, ' Doesn't  this 
claim from Reid posit something that rea11y is present? If you need that 
c la im to finish off your argument, haven 't I made my point? ' Not necessar­
i ly, because Reid's reference to ' the present ' can be understood to designate 
the cross-section of experiences that are simultaneous with one 's conscious­
ness of them. There is nothing more, ontological ly speaking, to the presence 
of experience than our being conscious of our experiences when they are 
happening . 
To this explanation of the presence of experience it may be objected that 
merely being (tenselessly) conscious of an experience when it is (tense­
lessly) occurring does not give knowledge of which experiences are [pres­
ent1y] occurring.  But I do not think this objection can be sustained, for the 
knowledge we seek can be explained tenselessIy, and the argument to the 
contrary is a non sequitur. 
According to a detenser, if I am conscious at tl of an experience that 
occurs tenselessly at  t ] ,  and if as a matter of tenseless fact it is t ] ,  then I know 
the experience is present. Of course, tensers use the same antecedent to infer 
that detensers cannot know which experiences are present , but such an 
inference is  based on a m isinterpretation of the tenseless view. The tenseless 
view gives rise to several different images. One is that of experiences in the 
B-series existing "eternal 1y" or total l y  outside of time.  Another v i ews expe­
riences as existing sempiternally or at every time; and stil l  another views 
experiences from a point of view outside of time, looking down at a l l  
experiences and events and seeing them as parts of a never changing pres­
ent. Each of these images falsifies the detenser's view in a fundamental way. 
On the tenseless theory, experiences and events are not eternal or sempiter­
nal ,  and they do not a11 exist at once , totum simul. Rather, experiences, l ike 
our consciousness of them, exist in time, in succession, one after another. 
We are in time and, therefore, conscious of our experiences from a temporal 
point of view. The significance of this last point can be c1arified by means 
of a spatia l  analogy. We are in space, and so experience things from a spatial 
point of view. 1 am here, hence distant from some places and near others . 
Accordingly, the answer to the question, 'Which things are existing here? ' 
depends on the place at which the question is asked. Simi larly, the answer 
to the question, 'Which events are existing now? '  depends on the time at 
which the question is asked. Right now, as 1 look at the clock on my desk it 
is 10 :00 am, September 1 1 , 1992 and so the experience of my looking at the 
clock (of which 1 am conscious) is known by me to be present . There is no 
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need to suppose there is  any special property o f  events that are present, or 
objeets that are here, that enable us to know which events are present or 
which objects are here . Admittedly, if we were somehow outside of time, 
and so nontempora1 1y eonscious of a1 1  our experienees (as God might be of 
the history of the world) , then no experienee eould be known to be present 
to the exclusion of others . But our eonsciousness of experienees, l ike the 
experienees themselves, are in time and at any given time we ean know what 
experienees are present simply by being eonscious of them as opposed to 
remembering or anticipating them. 
To a1 1  this Hestevold makes the following reply. If, at t "  1 reeord the 
presenee of my experienee of say, an exerueiating toothaehe, by te1 1 ing the 
dentist, '1 am now in pain' then on the tenseless theory that means ' t 1 is 
tenselessly oeeurring, and my exerueiating pain is (tenselessly) oeeurring at 
t 1 ' .  However, that judgment is  true at any time, and so would not be suffi­
cient to eonvey to the dentist the requisite information, namely, that I am in 
pain now. In order to eonvey that information the tensed faet that my pain 
is now occurring is indispensable. 
Once again, Hestevold's argument is  a non sequitur. It proves that the 
tenseless sentenee [ ' t 1 is tenselessly oceurring, and my excruciating pain is 
(tenselessly) oceurring at t 1 ' ]  does not ha ve the same meaning as the tensed 
sentence ( ' 1  am now in pain ' ) ,  but it does not prove that the two sentenees 
are used to describe different states of affairs; one describing a tenseless 
faet and the other deseribing a tensed faet (ef. Wil 1 iams [ 1 4] ) .  Admittedly, 
the tensed sentenee eonveys more information than the tenseless one, but it  
does not follow that it does so beeause of the real ity of tense . The dentist 
who hears the tensed sentenee token '1 am now in pain ' knows that I am 
using that sentence to describe a state of affairs existing simuItaneous with 
my utteranee, and so he or she administers the anaesthetic .  Whereas if 1 
uttered the tenseless sentence the dentist would not know that I needed rel ief 
now unless he knew what time it was. Thus, the two sentences do not 
eonvey the same information and so do not ha ve the same meaning. Never­
theless, it does not fol low that they do not describe the same state of affairs 
and, more genera lly the indispensabil ity of tensed discourse does not imply 
the indispensability of tensed facts. 
Before leaving the topie of the presenee of experience, 1 want to consider 
another phenomenological datum that allegedly supports the tensed theory. 
George Sehlesinger has defended the tensed theory by appealing to the 
experience of the NOW as ' the point in time at whieh an individual who is 
temporal ly extended is  alive, real or Exists with a eapital E'  ( [ 1 2] :  23) . More 
reeently he claimed ' our attitude toward the present may be described as 
regarding it  as distinet from every other temporal position, for while the 
future is yet to be bom and the past is rapidly fading, the present is palpably 
real ' ( [ 1 1 ] :  427) . 1 suggest we can make sense of Schlesinger 's phenomeno­
logical claims without countenancing transitory temporal properties. Again, 
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a spatial analogy may help .  1 am here, and so experienee spaee differently 
from the way 1 would if  1 were outside of spaee. 1 ean know what goes on 
in distant plaees, and given eausal laws, 1 ean affeet what goes on elsewhere 
less surely, and reasonably regard what goes on there as less important 
beeause it affeets my l ife mueh less . S imilarly, 1 am now (at this time) , 
henee those events that are at temporal ly  distant times are less affected by 
me and ha ve less affect upon me, than those whieh are in the present .  Thus, 
1 may reasonably regard what is  happening now as being more i mportant, 
or more real ,  and that is the only (harmless) sense in whieh the present is 
" palpably real "  or Exists with a eapital E;  the reality of tense has nothing to 
do with i t .  
O u r  Attitudes Toward the Future and the Past 
Another argument intended to demonstrate that the tenseless theory of 
time eannot be squared with our experienee is based on the c1aim that dread 
and relief are inexplieable attitudes on the tenseless theory. Hestevold ex­
plains the reasoning underlying this c 1a im in the fol lowing passage : 
On Monday 1 dread the painful tooth extraetion seheduled for Tuesday, 
and on Wednesday 1 am rel ieved that the extraetion is oyer. Dread on 
Monday and relief on Wednesday are appropriate attitudes to have 
toward the Tuesday tooth extraetion. If ST [the static theory] is eorreet, 
however, then dread and relief are never appropriate sinee there are no 
future and past events toward which to direet them ! That Wednesday 
follows the day of the tooth extraetion is a tenseless faet whieh is true 
before, during and after the extraction .  Thus it is as appropriate to feel 
relief that Wednesday fol lows Tuesday before or during the extraetion 
as it is to feel sueh relief on Wednesday. But this is absurd . . . .  Henee, 
TT [the tensed theory] must be adopted to make sense of the appropri­
ateness of our attitudes toward the future and the past ( [3] : 544-545) .  
Hestevold's point is  that sinee the faet, Wednesday is later than Tuesday, is 
a faet that exists before Wednesday, if that faet is  what explains relief, then 
it is just as sensible to feel rel ief on Monday or Tuesday for a painful 
experienee that is taking plaee on Tuesday as it is to feeJ relief on Wednes­
day for the same painfuJ experienee.  
The mistake in this argument is the assumption that the tenseless faet that 
renders rel ief appropriate exists before, during and after the extraetion. On 
the tenseless view, the faet in question does not exist before, after or during 
the extraetion. The pain ex ists before the relief, and the experienee of the 
relief exists after the eessation of pain, but the fact that the pain occurs 
before Wednesday (or that the relief occurs after the pain) does not exist in 
time at all .  Thus, whi le it is " always" true to assert that ' Wednesday fol lows 
Tuesday ' i t  does not follow that Wednesday 's following Tuesday always 
exists and so Hestevold ought not eonclude that relief is justified before the 
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pain o r  during i t .  To think that i t  i s  justified is to eonfuse tenseless faets with 
sempiternal things. 
Further evidenee that Hestevold does make that eonfusion oeeurs when 
he says, 
After aII, on Wednesday, there is a sense in which the extraetion is not 
oyer; on Wednesday, the extraetion is "eternaIly" and tenselessly oe­
eurring on Tuesday ( [3] : 545) . 
Again, this way of viewing the matter is fraught with diffieuIties. To say that 
an extraetion is tenselessly oeeurring on Tuesday (t2) is to say, assuming that 
time is relational ,  that the extraetion is  símu\taneous wíth eaeh member of 
the set of símultaneous events that eonstitutes t2 . That fact, however, does 
not exist on Tuesday, or on Wednesday, or on any other day ; it is eternal .  
But t o  say that an event's oeeurring a t  a eertain time is  a n  eternal faet, does 
not imply that the event in some sense is a lways oeeurring, although looked 
at from an external Godlike perspeetive i t  may appear as if this is  so. But 
from the ínside, and in reality, our painful experienees are (hopefully) 
shortlived, and as they are sueeeeded by more pleasant experienees my 
awareness of the painful ones beeome a mere memory. Indeed it is just this 
sueeession of different psyehological attitudes toward the same event (first 
anticipation, then eonseiousness, then memory) that gives rise to the im­
pression of time's flow, and i t  is that impression that provides the basis for 
our different attitudes toward the future and the past. 
Aeeepting aI I  this, a eritie may wonder why treating faets as outside of 
time helps to resolve Hestevold's problem. If it is always true that the dread 
oeeurs before the painful experienee, and the faet of the dread oeeurring 
before the pain never ehanges, why should 1 be happy now that the tooth­
aehe is  oyer? Of eourse, if  the painful experienee will oeeur, but is  not yet 
oeeurring, that is,  if i t  will move from the future to the present with the 
passage of time, then, so the eritie aI leges, we ean easily understand an 
attitude or feeling of dread.  We eannot understand that attitude on the 
tenseless theory, where aIl events exist and nothing reaIIy moves through 
time at all . In short ,  the tenseless theory never explains why dread is "ap­
propriate" before a bad event rather than after or during it .  
One way of responding to this objection is to question the premise upon 
whieh it  is based, namely, the assumption that the feeling of dread is appro­
priate when the dreaded event is in the future. Perhaps we should say dread 
is an appropriate attitude to take before an unwelcome event in that it is  a 
rational attitude to take. However, it might plausibly be argued that dread 
often is not rational if i t  does not make us more efficient in meeting the 
problems we faee. Dread of a dentist 's v isit does nothing but make one 's 
\ ife miserable before the visit, and it may even stop us from keeping our 
appointments. It serves in no way to direct one 's aetions, sinee the visit is 
neeessary for good health. So, although it is  natural enough, perhaps, at 
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least for a certain sort of personality, to dread certain sorts of events, it is  
not  clear it is appropriate in the sense of being rational .  
Maybe it  is in  general useful to  dread bad  events because dread in general 
motivates us to prepare for or avoid such events in  ways that we would not 
employ if we did not experience dread.  So it is easy to see how dread might 
evolve biologically. But, l ike many biologically evolved defence systems,  
this one often actual ly does harm, preventing us  from acting efficiently, and 
so must often be controlIed or suppressed if one is to behave more reason­
ably. Dread before the event is functional (when dread is functional at al I)  
because one can st i 1 1  do something about it .  The same feel ing after the event 
is never functional , so never appropriate. Thus, our attitude toward dread is 
I ike the attitude we have toward preparing oneself, say, for an exam - it 
makes sense before but not after the exam because preparation affects the 
outcome. Simi1arly, if  dread spurs on preparation it might have survival  
value and thus be appropriate before the event, but not after. In other words, 
the causal efficacy of dread,  and the direction of causal ity in time are what 
explain its appropriateness before, but not after, the event . 5  S ince that ex­
planation works perfeetly weB for a detenser, I eonelude neither the pres­
enee of experienee nor our attitudes toward the past, present or future pose 
i nsurmountable difficulties for an adequate analysis of tenseless time.6 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The most elaborate defense of the tensed theory of time is found in Quentin Smith 
[ 1 4] .  
2Proponents o f  the n ew lenseless Iheory o f  I ¡me include Michel le  Beer [ 1 ] ,  D .  H .  
Mel lor [5] , and L .  Nathan Oa klander [7], [8] . 
3Recent discllssions of this type of argument are found in Brian Garretl [2] , Delmas 
Kiernan-Lewis [4] , and L. Nathan Oaklander [8] . 
4Also, of course, the word 'dread'  conta ins 'before the event '  in i ts meaning or 
usage-after the event one may regret or rue i t ,  or look back on it with horror, bllt 
one cannot dread i I .  But looking back on i t  with horror is c 10se enollgh to the feeling 
of dread so we can get away from mere grammar here and ask why such a feel ing 
of horror i s  not  appropriate after i t  is oyer. If  one holds that dread is appropriate 
even when i t  is dysfllnctiona l ,  merely because the evenl rea\ ly  is awful ,  then looking  
back  on  i t  with hotror would a lso be  appropriate. 
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